We study the wealth distribution in Bewley economies with idiosyncratic capital income risk (entrepreneurial risk). We …nd, under rather general conditions, a unique ergodic distribution of wealth which displays fat tails (a Pareto distribution in the right tail).
Introduction
Bewley economies, as e.g. in Bewley (1977 Bewley ( , 1983 and Aiyagari (1994) . 1 represent one of the fundamental workhorses of modern macroeconomics, its main tool when moving away from the study of e¢ cient economies with a representative agent by allowing e.g., for incomplete markets. 2 In these economies the evolution of aggregate variables does not generally constitute a su¢ cient representation of equilibrium, which instead requires the characterization of the dynamics of the distributions across heterogeneous agents.
In Bewley economies each agent faces a stochastic process for labor earnings and solves an in…nite horizon consumption-saving problem with incomplete markets. Typically, agents are restricted to save by investing in a risk-free bond and are not allowed to borrow. The postulated process for labor earnings determines the dynamics of the equilibrium distributions for consumption, savings, and wealth. More recent speci…ca-tions of the model allow for aggregate risks and an equilibrium determination of labor earnings and interest rates. 3 Bewley models have been successful in the study of several macroeconomic phenomena of interest. Calibrated versions of this class of models have been used to study welfare costs of in ‡ation (Imrohoroglu, 1992) , asset pricing (Mankiw, 1986 and Huggett, 1993) , unemployment bene…ts (Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 1992) , …scal policy (Aiyagari, 1995 Stochastic labor endowments can in principle generate some skewness in the distribution of wealth, especially if the labor endowment process is itself skewed and persistent. On the other hand, Bewley models have generally found it di¢ cult to reproduce the observed distribution of wealth in many countries; see e.g., Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993) . 4 More speci…cally, they have found it di¢ cult to reproduce the high inequality (as measured, e.g., by Gini coe¢ cients) and the fat tails (as e.g., in Pareto distributions) that empirical distributions of wealth tend to display. 5 This is because at high wealth levels, the incentives for further precautionary savings tapers o¤ and the tails of wealth distribution remain thin; see Carroll (1997) and Quadrini (1999) for a discussion of these issues. 6 In the present paper we study the wealth distribution in the context of Bewley economies extended to allow for idiosyncratic capital income risk. Capital income risk is naturally interpreted as entrepreneurial risk. 7 To this end we provide …rst an analysis of the standard income ‡uctuation problem, as e.g., in Chamberlain-Wilson (2000), extended to account for capital income risk; see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) , Ch. 16, as well as Rios-Rull (1995) and Krusell-Smith (2006) , for a review of results regarding the standard income ‡uctuation problem. 8 We restrict ourselves to idiosyncratic labor earnings and capital income for simplicity. We …nally embed the economy into general equilibrium, through a neoclassical production function along the lines of Aiyagari (1994) and Angeletos (2007) , where capital risk and labor earnings are endogenously determined at equilibrium.
Complementing our previous papers (Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu, 2012 and 2013), which focus on overlapping generation economies, 9 we show that Bewley economies with idiosyncratic capital income risk display under rather general assumptions a stationary wealth distribution which is fat tailed, more precisely it is a Pareto distribution in the right tail. We also show that it is capital income risk, rather than labor earnings, that drives the properties of the right tail of the wealth distribution. 6 See also Cagetti and De Nardi (2008) for a survey. 7 Capital income risk has been introduced by Angeletos and Calvet (2005) and Angeletos (2007) and further studied by Panousi (2008) and by ourselves Zhu, 2011 and . Quadrini (1999 Quadrini ( , 2000 and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) study entrepreneurial risk explicitly. We refer to these papers and our previous papers, as well as to Benhabib and Bisin (2006) and Benhabib and Zhu (2008) , for more general evidence on the macroeconomic relevance of capital income risk. 8 The work by Levhari and Snirvasan (1969) , Schectman (1976), Schectman and Escudero (1977), Chamberlain-Wilson (2000), Huggett (1993) , Rabault (2002) , Carroll and Kimball (2005) has been instrumental to provide several incremental pieces to the characterization of the solution of (various speci…cations of) the income ‡uctuation problem. 9 Other life-cycle models of the distribution of wealth include Huggett (1996) and Rios-Rull (1995). 10 An alternative approach to generate fat tails without stochastic returns or discounting is to introduce a model with bequests, where the probability of death (and/or retirement) is independent of age. In these models, the stochastic component is not stochastic returns but the length of life. For models that embody such features see Wold and Whittle (1957) , Castaneda, Gimenez and Rios-Rull (2003) and Benhabib and Bisin (2006) . Relatedly, Krusell and Smith (1998) introduce heterogeneous discount rates to produce some skewness in the distribution of wealth.
The income ‡uctuation problem with idiosyncratic capital income risk
Consider an in…nite horizon agent at time t = 0 choosing a consumption process fc t g 1 t=0
and a wealth process fa t+1 g 1 t=0 to maximize his utility, discounted at a rate < 1 subject to the accumulation equation for wealth,
where fy t g 1 t=0 is the earning process and fR t+1 g 1 t=0 the rate of return process. Suppose the agent also faces a no-borrowing constraint at each time t:
In this paper we consider the following speci…cation of this income ‡uctuation problem:
The utility function is Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA): R t and y t are stochastic processes, identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) over time; furthermore y t has probability density function f (y) on bounded support [y; y], with y > 0;
R t has probability density function g(R) on support [R; 1), with R > 0.
We also impose the following assumptions.
Note that Assumption 2 implies that ER t < 1.
Assumption 3 Pr( R t > 1) > 0 and any …nite moment of R t exists.
Assumption 4 ( y) < E R t (y t ) .
We shall in part relax these assumptions in Section 4. In summary, the income ‡uctuation problem with idiosyncratic capital income risk (IF) that we study in this section is the following:
It is useful to brie ‡y outline at the outset our strategy to show that the Bewley economy, extended to include idiosyncratic capital income risk, can generate a wealth distribution with fat tails, that is a distribution that does not have all moments. As in the Aiyagari (1994) model, the borrowing constraint together with stochastic incomes assures a lower bound to assets which acts as a re ‡ecting barrier (See Lemma 7 in the Appendix). Since discounted expected returns, E(R t ), are less than 1 on average, the economy contracts, giving rise to a stationary distribution of assets. However, since we cannot obtain explicit solutions for consumption or savings policies, we have to explicitly show that under suitable assumptions there are no disjoint invariant sets or cyclic sets in assets, so that agents do not get trapped in subsets of the support of the asset distribution. In other words we have to show that the stochastic process for assets is ergodic, and that a unique stationary distribution exists. We show this in Lemmas 6 and 8 in the Appendix. We then have to show that, unlike in the basic Aiyagari (1994) model with stochastic earnings and deterministic returns on wealth, introducing idiosyncratic capital income risk can generate a fat-tailed asset distribution. Since explicit linear solutions are not available even under CRRA preferences, we cannot use the results of Kesten (1973) for linear recursions. Instead we use a generalization of the Kesten results for non-linear stochastic processes that are asymptotically linear, due to Mirek (2011) . We show the asymptotic linearity of the consumption and savings policies which, under appropriate assumptions allow us to use the results of Mirek (2011) (see Propositions 3, 4 and 5) and we characterize the fat tail of the stationary distribution in Theorem 3. Finally, using a "span of control" approach with idiosyncratic productivity shocks and a competitive labor market as in Angeletos (2007) , we show in Section 5 that our results for a fat tailed distribution of wealth can be embedded in a general equilibrium setting.
In the remaining of this section we show several technical results about the consumption function c(a) which solves this problem, as a build-up for its characterization in the next section. All proofs are in the Appendix. 
and ii the transversality condition lim
represents a solution of the IF problem given by 1.
By strict concavity of u(c), there exists a unique c(a) which solves 1, the IF problem. The study of c(a) requires studying two auxiliary problems. The …rst is a version the IF problem 1, where the stochastic process for earnings fy t g 1 0 is turned o¤, that is, y t = 0, for any t 0. The second is a …nite horizon version of the IF problem 1 . In both cases we naturally maintain the relevant speci…cation and assumptions imposed on 1, our main IF problem.
The IF problem with no earnings
The formal problem is:
This problem can indeed be solved in closed form, following Levhari and Srinivasan (1969) . Note that, for this problem, the borrowing constraint is never binding, because Inada conditions are satis…ed for CRRA utility.
Proposition 1
The unique solution of (4), the IF problem with no earnings, is c no (a) = a; for some 0 < < 1:
The …nite IF problem
For any T > 0, let the …nite IF problem be:
With some notational abuse, let c t denote consumption t periods from the end-period T , that is, at time T t.
Proposition 2
The unique solution of (5), the …nite IF problem, is a consumption function c t (a) which is continuous and increasing in a. Furthermore, let s t denote the induced savings function,
Then s t (a) is also continuous and increasing in a.
The IF problem
We can now derive a relation between c t (a), c no (a) and c(a). This result is a straightforward extension of Proposition 2.3 and Proposition 2.4 in Rabault (2002) .
t (a) exists, it is continuous and satis…es the Euler equation. Furthermore, lim t!1 c t (a) is higher than the optimal consumption function of the no laborincome problem, lim
The main result of this section follows:
Theorem 2 The solution of (1), the IF problem, is the consumption function c(a) which is obtained as lim t!1 c t (a).
Characterization of c(a)
Let the induced savings function s(a) be
Proposition 3 The consumption and savings functions c(a) and s(a) are continuous and increasing in a.
Carroll and Kimball (2005) show that c t (a) is concave. But Lemma 2 guarantees that c(a) = lim t!1 c t (a) and thus c(a) is also a concave function of a.
Proposition 4
The consumption function c(a) is a concave function of a.
The most important result of this section is that the optimal consumption function c(a), in the limit for a ! 1, is linear and has the same slope as the optimal consumption function of the income ‡uctuation problem with no earnings, .
The proof is non-trivial; see the Appendix.
The stationary distribution
In this section we study the distribution of wealth in an economy populated by a continuum of measure 1 agents who solve the income ‡uctuation problem IF, given by 1, when their earnings and investment risk are uncorrelated, that is, i.i.d. in the cross-section. The wealth accumulation equation of the IF problem in 1 is
It is useful to compare it with the IF problem given by 4 that has no earnings, y t = 0. Using Lemma 1 we have:
The main result in this section is the following.
Theorem 3 There exists a unique stationary distribution for a t+1 which satis…es the stochastic wealth accumulation equation 6. Furthermore, the distribution has a fat tail, i.e., there exist 1 < < 1 and an > 0 arbitrarily small such that E (M ) = 1; M = R t and < :
and lim inf
where C is a positive constant.
The proof, in the Appendix, requires several steps. First we show that the wealth accumulation process fa t+1 g 1 t=0 induced by equation 6 above is irreducible and that a = y represents a re ‡ecting barrier for the process. To show that there exists a unique stationary wealth distribution we exploit the results in Meyn and Tweedie (2009) and show that the process fa t+1 g 1 t=0 is ergodic. Finally, to show that the wealth accumulation process fa t+1 g 1 t=0 has a fat tail, we use the characterization of c(a) and s(a) in Section 2.4, and in particular the fact that
is increasing in a and
approaches as a goes to in…nity; this allows us to apply some results by Mirek (2011) regarding conditions for asymptotically Pareto stationary distributions for processes induced by non-linear stochastic di¤erence equations.
Extensions
We discuss how to relax the speci…cation of the IF problem 1 along two main relevant directions.
Earning' s growth. We can allow for exogenous growth g > 1 in earnings y t as in Aiyagari-McGrattan (1998) . To this end, we need to de ‡ate the variables by the growth rate. In principle the borrowing constraint should be assumed to grow at the economy's growth rate in this case. In our context, since we allow for no borrowing, no modi…cation of the constraint is needed. However, Assumption 3 would have to be modi…ed so that Pr(
Bounded returns. We can also allow for an upper bound in the support of R t . Consider a distribution of R on a bounded support [R ; R] which satis…es all assumptions except that of unbounded support. Let its density be denoted f: Evaluate > 1 and perturb f , the distribution of R; as follows:
and f (R; ") has mass ": Note that f (:; 0) = f , so that we e¤ectively produced a continuous parametrization of the distribution f . The parametrization is continuous in the sense that R g(r)f (R; ")dR is continuous in " for any continuous function g: Now this construction guarantees that wealth a can escape to the expanding region with positive probability ": Indeed by Berge's maximum theorem : As a consequence, this construction produces an economy whose stationary distribution of wealth has fat tails even with a distribution of R which is bounded above.
General equilibrium
In this section we embed the analysis of the distribution of wealth induced by the IF problem 1 in general equilibrium. Following Angeletos (2007) we assume that each agent acts as entrepreneur of his own individual …rm. Each …rm has a constant returns to scale production function F (k; n; A) where k; n are, respectively, capital and labor, and A is an idiosyncratic productivity shock. Note that for notational economy we suppress the superscript i that denotes the i0th …rm. The agent can only use his own savings as capital in his own …rm. In each period t + 1, the agent …rst observes his …rm's productivity shock A t+1 and then decides how much labor to hire in a competitive labor market, n t+1 . Therefore, each …rm faces the same market wage rate w t+1 . The agent can decide not to engage in production, in which case n t+1 = 0 and he can carry over the …rm's capital to next period. The agent's earnings in period t + 1 are w t+1 e t+1 , where e t+1 is his idiosyncratic (exogenous) labor supply. The …rm's pro…ts in period t + 1 are denoted t+1 :
De…nition 5 A stationary general equilibrium consists of policy functions, c t , n t , and k t+1 , a (constant) wage rate w, and a distribution v(a t+1 ), such that the following conditions hold: (i) c t , n t , and k t+1 are optimal policy functions given w.
We can now construct such a stationary distribution. The …rst order conditions of each agent …rm's labor choice requires
which, under constant returns to scale, implies
From constant returns to scale, we then obtain t+1 = R t+1 k t+1 :
11
The dynamic equation for wealth is then
From equation (7) we can solve
and hence obtain the labor market clearing condition:
where
Given the wealth a t , the agent chooses its consumption c t and savings k t+1 . Given the wage rate w t+1 , k t+1 , and its realization of A t+1 , the …rm chooses employment n t+1 . Then each agent receives its own …rm's pro…ts and labor earnings w t+1 e t+1 , which forms a t+1 . The stochastic process fa t+1 g 1 t=0 permits a unique stationary distribution as in our analysis of the wealth distribution induced by the IF problem given by 1. The stationary distribution of a t+1 induces then a stationary distribution of k t+1 . The aggregate capital K t+1 is the …rst moment of the stationary distribution of k t+1 and is then constant. As a consequence, from equation (8) , the wage clearing the labor market, w t+1 ; can be solved as a constant wage w.
Simulations
Being carried out, to be completed.
Conclusions
In this paper we construct a general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic capital income risks in a Bewley economy and show that the resulting wealth distribution can have fat tails. 11 More speci…cally, R t+1 = max(! t+1 ; 1) and ! t+1 = [26] Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten, and G.L. Violante (2007): "Consumption and labor supply with partial insurance: An analytical framework," mimeo, New York University.
[27] Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten, and G.L. Violante (2008a): "Insurance and opportunities: a welfare analysis of labor market risk," Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(3), 501-25.
[28] Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten, and G.L. Violante (2008b): "The macroeconomic implications of rising wage inequality in the United States," mimeo, New York University.
Proof of Theorem 1. A feasible policy c(a) is said to overtake another feasible policŷ c(a) if starting from the same initial wealth a 0 , the policies c(a) andĉ(a) yield stochastic consumption processes (c t ) and (ĉ t ) that satisfy
Also, a feasible policy is said to be optimal if it overtakes all other feasible policies.
Proof: For an a 0 , the stochastic consumption process (c t ) is induced by the policy c(a). Let (ĉ t ) be an alternative stochastic consumption process, starting from the same initial wealth a 0 . By the strict concavity of u( ), we have
From the budget constraint we have a t+1 = R t+1 (a t c t ) + y t+1 andâ t+1 = R t+1 (â t ĉ t ) + y t+1 : For a path of (R t ; y t ), we have
and
Therefore we have
Using a 0 =â 0 and rearranging terms, we have
Using equation (9) we have
Thus we have
By the Euler equation (2) we have u 0 (c t )
Combining equations (10) and (11) we have
By the transverality condition (3) we know that for large T ,
Proof of Proposition 1. The Euler equation of this problem is
Guess c t = a t . From the Euler equation (12) we have
It is easy to verify the transversality condition,
Let V t (a) be the optimal value function of an agent who has wealth a and has t periods to the end T . Thus we have
We have the Euler equation of this problem, for t > 1
Proof of Proposition 2. Continuity is a consequence of the Theorem of the maximum and mathematical induction. The proof that c t (a) and s t (a) are increasing can be easily adapted from the proof of Theorem 1.5 of Schechtman (1976) ; it makes use of the fact that c t (a) > 0, a consequence of Inada conditions which hold for CRRA utility functions.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 1 we know that c(a) satis…es the Euler equation. Now we verify that c(a) satis…es the transversality condition (3).
By theorems 1 and 1 we have c t a t :
Note that a t ȳ for t 1. We have u 0 (c t )a t ȳ 1 for t 1:
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 1, c(a) is continuous. Thus s(a) is continuous since s(a) = a c(a). Also, by Lemma 1, lim t!1 s t (a) = s(a), since lim t!1 c t (a) = c(a), s t (a) = a c t (a), and s(a) = a c(a). The conclusion that c(a) and s(a) are increasing in a follows from part (ii) of proposition 2. Proof. Suppose that s(a) > 0 for a >ȳ . Pick a 0 >ȳ . For any …nite t 0, we have a t >ȳ and u 0 (c t ) = ER t+1 u 0 (c t+1 ). Thus
By theorems 1 and 1 we have c t a t > ȳ :
Thus equation (13) implies that
Thus the right hand side of equation (14) approaches 0 as t goes to in…nity. A contradiction. Thus s( ) = 0 for some >ȳ . By the monotonicity of s(a), we know that s(a) = 0, 8a 2 (0; ].
We can now show the following:
is decreasing in a.
Proof. By lemma 2 we know that c(ȳ ) =ȳ . For 8a >ȳ , This implies that
Since c(a) is Lipschitz continuous, we have
Combining inequalities (15) and (16) 
Note that 1 since c(a) a. The Euler equation of this problem is c t ER t+1 c t+1 with equality if c t < a t :
Lemma 4 2 [ ; 1):
From the Euler equation (18) we have
since c t+1 a t+1 and 1.
By Fatou's lemma we have
A contradiction.
From Lemma 4 we know that c t < a t when a t is large enough. Thus the equality of the Euler equation holds c t = ER t+1 c t+1 :
Taking limits on both sides of equation (19) we have
We turn to the computation of lim at!1 ER t+1 c t+1 at .
In order to compute lim at!1 ER t+1 c t+1 at
, we …rst show a lemma.
Lemma 5 For 8H > 0, 9J > 0, such that a t+1 > H for a t > J. Here J does not depend on realizations of R t+1 and y t+1 .
Proof. Note that
From equation (17) we know that for some " > 0,
And
We pick J > J 1 such that R (1 ")
. Thus for a t > J, we have
This implies that
From equation (17) we know that for some > 0, 9H > 0, such that
for a t+1 > H. From Lemma 5 and equations (21) and (22) we have
for a t > J. And ( ) (1 ") ER Thus by the Dominated convergence theorem, we have
Combining equations (20) and (23) we have
By Lemma 4 we know that > 0. Thus we …nd from equation (24)
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof requires several steps.
Lemma 6
The wealth accumulation process (a t ) is irreducible.
Proof. First we show that the process (a t ) is ' irreducible, i.e. there exists a non trivial measure ' on [ȳ ,1) such that if '(A) > 0, the probability that the process enters the set A in …nite time is strictly positive for any initial condition (see Chapter 4 of Meyn and Tweedie (2009)).
We construct a measure ' on [ȳ ,1) such that
Note that the borrowing constraint binds in …nite time with a positive probability for 8a 0 2 [ȳ ,1). Suppose not. For any …nite t 0, we have a t >ȳ and u 0 (c t ) = ER t+1 u 0 (c t+1 ). Following the same procedure as in the proof of lemma 2, we obtain a contradiction. If the borrowing constraint binds at period t, then a t+1 = y t+1 . Thus any set A such that R A f (y)dy > 0 can be reached in …nite time with a positive probability. The process (a t ) is ' irreducible.
By Proposition 4.2.2, there exists a probability measure on [ȳ ,1) such that the process fa t+1 g 1 t=0 is irreducible, since it is ' irreducible.
Lemma 7 Under Assumption 4, a = ȳ is a re ‡ecting barrier of the process (a t ).
Proof. If a t =ȳ , then there existsŷ close to y such that Pr(a t+1 2 [ŷ; y]ja t =ȳ ) = Pr(y t+1 2 [ŷ; y]) > 0, since s(ȳ ) = 0. To show that a t+2 can be greater than y with a positive probability, it is su¢ cient to show that s( y) > 0. Suppose that s( y) = 0. Thus
Thus by the Euler equation we have
This is impossible under Assumption 4. Thus s( y) > 0 and a =ȳ is a re ‡ecting barrier of the process fa t+1 g 1 t=0 . To show that there exists a unique stationary wealth distribution, we have to show that the process (a t ) is ergodic. Actually, we can show that it is geometrically ergodic. 
By Lemma 6, the process fa t+1 g We now show that an interval [ȳ ,B] is a petite set for 8B >ȳ . To show this, we …rst show that R s(a)+ȳ < a for a 2 (ȳ ; 1). For s(a) = 0, this is obviously true. For s(a) > 0, suppose that R s(a)+ȳ a, we have
We obtain a contradiction since Assumption 2 implies that ER t < 1. Also by Lemma 2, there exists an interval
, there exists a common t such that the borrowing constraint binds at period t with a positive probability. Then for any set A [ȳ , y], Pr(a t+1 2 Ajs(a t ) = 0) = R A f (y)dy. Note that a t step probability transition kernel is the probability transition kernel of a speci…c sampled chain. Thus we construct a measure v a on [ȳ ,1) such that v a has a positive measure on [ȳ , y] and v a (( y; 1)) = 0. The t step probability transition kernel of a process starting from 8a 0 2 [ȳ ,B] is greater than the measure v a . An interval [ȳ ,B] is a petite set for 8B >ȳ .
We pick a function
. Thus C is a petite set. Therefore, for 8a t 2 [ȳ ,1), we have
where I C ( ) is an indicator function.
By Theorem 15.0.1 of Meyn and Tweedie (2009) the process (a t ) is geometrically ergodic.
We now show that the stationary distribution, a consequence geometric ergodicity, has a fat tail. Since Now we apply Theorem 1.8 of Mirek (2011) , to show that the stochastic process fã t+1 g 1 t=0 , induced byã t+1 = (ã t ), has a unique stationary distribution and that the tail of the stationary distribution forã t+1 is asymptotic to a Pareto law, i.e. It is easy to verify that j (a) M aj < N t for 8a 2 [ȳ ; 1):
Thus ( ) satis…es Assumption 1.6 (Shape of the mappings) of Mirek (2011) . Obviously, the conditional law of log M is non arithmetic. Let h(d) = log E (M ) d . By Assumption 2 we have E ( R t ) < 1. Thus h(1) = log E (M ) log E ( R) < 0. We now show that Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 imply that there exists > 1 such that E(R t ) > 1. By Jensen's inequality we have E(R t ) 1 (ER t ) 1 . And Assumption 2 implies that ER t < 1. Thus = E(R t )
By Assumption 3, Pr( R t > 1) > 0. Thus there exists > 1 such that E(R t ) > 1.
We could pick such that ( ) E(R t ) > 1. Thus h( ) = log E (M ) > 0. By Moreover, E [(M ) j log M j] < 1, since M has a lower bound, and, by Assumption 3, any …nite moment of R t exists.
We also know that E(N t ) < 1 since y t has bounded support and, by Assumption 3, any …nite moment of R t exists.
Thus M and N t satisfy Assumption 1.7 (Moments condition for the heavy tail) of Mirek (2011) .
By Lemma 7, a =ȳ is a re ‡ecting barrier of the process fa t+1 g 1 t=0 . Also we assume that the support of R t is unbounded. Thus the support of the stationary distribution forã t+1 is unbounded.
Applying Theorem 1.8 of Mirek (2011), we …nd that the stationary distributionã t+1 has a Pareto tail. Finally, we show that the stationary wealth distribution a t+1 , has a fat tail.
Pick a 0 =ã 0 . The stochastic process fa t+1 g 1 t=0 is induced by a t+1 = R t+1 s(a t ) + y t+1 :
And the stochastic process fã t+1 g 1 t=0 is induced bỹ a t+1 = R t+1 l(ã t ) + y t+1 :
For a path of (R t ; y t ), we have a t ã t . Thus for 8a >ȳ , we have Pr(a t > a) Pr(ã t > a):
This implies that Pr(a t+1 > a) Pr(ã t+1 > a);
since the stochastic processes fa t+1 g Pr(ã t+1 > a) a = C:
